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Employment Arbitration at the
Crossroads: An Assessment and
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Stephen L. Hayford, * Jamie Darn Prenkert, ** & Anjanette H. Raymond***
ABSTRACT
The use of arbitration in every sector has grown substantially in recent dec-
ades. This is nowhere truer than in the employment arbitration field. Reflecting
this growth, the U.S. Supreme Court has fielded numerous attacks upon arbitra-
tion, ranging from state laws targeting arbitration for differential treatment to par-
ties attempting to challenge specific agreements and awards on a variety of legal
theories. Nonetheless, to date all of these attempts have failed. The U.S. Supreme
Court has taken a consistent, literal approach to section 2 of the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act (FAA), finding arbitration agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract." The time has come to recognize the end of this stage of the debate.
Arbitration agreements must be on equal footing with all types of contracts. This
stark reality demands that the various stakeholders in the arbitration community
converge in the interest of designing and institutionalizing arbitration mechanics
and processes that, as a start, exceed the minimum requirements to avoid argu-
ments of substantive unconscionability and, more broadly, provide the fair, just,
and accountable alternative dispute resolution system the FAA and the U.S. Su-
preme Court have indicated it can be.
This paper seeks to guide this next stage of the debate by first reviewing the
doctrinal developments over the past thirty years that led to a settled state of arbi-
tration law. We then exhort the various stakeholders to collectively take up the
challenge of this next stage. In particular, we hope to prompt that cooperation by
laying out the essential elements of a fair and just employment arbitration mecha-
nism.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Employment arbitration in the non-union sector is governed by the remarka-
bly consistent and doctrinally focused body of commercial arbitration law created
by the U.S. Supreme Court over the last three decades.1 Since 1983, the Court has
effectively reinvented the law of commercial arbitration, giving full voice and
effect to the command of section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act in that contrac-
tual agreements to arbitrate future controversies "shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract."2 The harsh truth created by the U.S. Supreme Court's broad and
unequivocal embrace of the rule of section 2 is that otherwise valid adhesion arbi-
tration agreements forced upon individual employees as a condition of their em-
ployment are enforceable as a matter of federal law under the FAA, provided
those agreements are fair in their substantive terms.
Understandably, this state of affairs is the source of great alarm and conster-
nation among the anti-arbitration forces in the plaintiffs' and public interest bars
and their allies in the scholarly community. At the end of their long-standing
crusade to exempt the employment and consumer sectors of the economy from the
sweeping rule of enforceability found by the U.S. Supreme Court in the straight-
forward words of section 2, those vocal opponents of employer-imposed arbitra-
1. See, e.g., Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. 500 U.S.
20 (1991); Green Tree Fin. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2001). See also Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123-24 (2001) (holding that employment arbitration agreements are not exempt-
ed from the reach of the FAA).
2. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
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tion find themselves without recourse. Their recent unsuccessful efforts to conse-
crate the class arbitration device as the antidote for adhesion arbitration agree-
ments-soundly rejected in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion3 and American Express
v. Italian Colors Restaurant-was the last stand in a thirty-year anti-arbitration
crusade that met defeat at virtually every turn before the U.S. Supreme Court.
Given the stark legal reality created by unwavering pro-arbitration stand of the
current conservative majority of the U.S. Supreme Court and the virtually zero
chance that Congress will enact the adhesion arbitration agreement proscription of
the oft-introduced Arbitration Fairness Act (AFA),5 what is the wisest path going
forward for everyone in the employment law community who is truly concerned
with workplace due process and employee rights? That query is the focus of this
commentary.
This article briefly recaps the sea change in the law of commercial arbitration
that began with the U.S. Supreme Court's 1983 opinion in Moses H. Cone Memo-
rial Hospital v. Mercury Creek Construction Corp.6 Next, the ramifications of
that comprehensive, now essentially complete, legal framework for employment
and commercial arbitration will be described. In the final substantive element of
this article, the authors propose a model employment arbitration mechanism that
will both pass legal muster under the current FAA regime, and also secure due
process and substantive rights for employees required to agree to adhesion arbitra-
tion agreements as a condition of employment.
II. THE CURRENT LEGAL REALITY DESCRIBED
For all practical purposes, the doctrinal outlines of the modern law of com-
mercial arbitration are now complete. Beginning with its seminal opinions from
1983 to 1985, 7 and continuing through the 2013 opinion in Italian Colors,8 the
Supreme Court has fashioned a body of law pertaining to the enforceability of
arbitration agreements falling within the reach of the interstate commerce clause
that is remarkable in both its clarity and its consistency. At every significant turn,
the Court has rejected efforts to limit the reach of the rule of section 2. The analy-
sis below describes the manner in which the Court has dispensed with each of the
five avenues of legal attack upon the enforceability of commercial arbitration
agreements mounted by the anti-arbitration bar and scholarly community.
These thirty years of decision by the Supreme Court were driven by its
sweeping view of the preemptive effect of the FAA.9 Time and again the Court
3. 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
4. 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013).
5. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931, 11 1th Cong. (2009); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009,
H.R. 1020, 111 th Cong. (2009).
6. 460 U.S. 1, 2 (1983) (creating a body of federal substantive law that is applicable in both state
and federal courts).
7. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001) (holding that employment contracts
fall within the FAA); see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 640 (1985) (holding that antitrust claims are arbitrable); Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24 (noting
the "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration").
8. 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013) (holding that the "effective vindication" exception does not guar-
antee class arbitration simply because an individual claim is expensive to prove).
9. See Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 16-17 (holding that states may not require a judicial forum for
the resolution of claims that the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration).
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has relied upon the preemptive effect of the FAA to reject efforts by states to limit
the reach of section 2.10 Thus, both the federal and the state courts are now bound
by the "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration,"11 and the "fundamental princi-
ple that arbitration is a matter of contract."12
Despite clear enumerations of the importance of contract by the Supreme
Court, hostility toward arbitration led the states to restrict the use of arbitration.
Using their power to regulate contracts, 13 states attempted to restrict the use of
arbitration in two ways: (1) by limiting the issues that can be resolved in arbitra-
tion, 14 and/or (2), by restricting the ability of certain parties to agree to arbitra-
tion,15 especially when arising within a contract of adhesion. 16 The Supreme
Court, relying on federal preemption and the command of section 2 prohibited the
states from singling out arbitration agreements for differential treatment.1 7 Even
state-created prohibitions on class-action waivers have been preempted by the
strong federal policy favoring arbitration.
1 8
As arbitration has made further inroads into the civil justice arena, states grew
concerned that arbitration awards would not provide the same legal certainty and
consistency provided by the judiciary. Such concerns resulted in state efforts to
expand judicial review of arbitration awards. Ultimately, these backdoor attempts
failed when the Supreme Court held that a party could not contractually create a
broader scope of review for state and federal courts 19 than the narrow scope of
scrutiny permitted by sections 10 and 11 of the FAA.20
Even attempts to ensure legally correct outcomes have failed. The Court has
held that parties cannot fall back on the judiciary as a means to overcome an arbi-
tration award that contains inaccurate, misapplied, or incorrect law, because the
parties "bargained for the arbitrator's construction of their agreement."21  Thus,
the sole question on judicial review is whether the arbitrator interpreted the par-
ties' contract, not whether he construed it correctly. The most recent attack on
the ability of arbitration to be used as an alternative to the judiciary ultimately
failed when the U.S. Supreme Court determined that concerns about the cost of
10. See, e.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S 395 (1967); Allied-Bruce
Terminix Cos. Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268 (1995).
11. Moses H. Crone, 460 U.S. at 24.
12. Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010).
13. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) ("[G]enerally applicable contract
defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agree-
ments without contravening [FAA] § 2.").
14. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 448 (2006) (holding that the
arbitrator is the appropriate party to determine the validity of the contract as a whole).
15. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (holding that California could not invali-
date arbitration clauses in franchise agreements).
16. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011) (citing Discover Bank v.
Superior Ct., 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005)).
17. See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995) ("The [FAA] makes
any such state policy unlawful, for that kind of policy would place arbitration clauses on an unequal
'footing,' directly contrary to the [FAA's] language and Congress' intent.").
18. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748.
19. Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 590 (2008).
20. 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (2012).
21. Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068 (2013).
22. Id. (citing Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 671 (2010)).
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the proceedings shall not overcome the strong federal policy supporting arbitration
and honoring agreements as written."
Adhesion contracts are a central feature of the relationship between employ-
ers and employees, as well as between businesses and consumers. If such con-
tracts are otherwise valid under relevant state contract law principles those adhe-
sion arbitration agreements can be evaded only if they are unconscionable.2 4 The
absence of voluntary employee consent likely renders every adhesion employment
arbitration agreement per se procedurally unconscionable. Nonetheless, the
overwhelming weight of authority demonstrates that a showing of procedural
unconscionability must be accompanied by proof of substantive unconscionability
for an agreement to be invalidated on unconscionability grounds.25 As a result,
the traditional focus on the procedural unfairness of forced employment arbitra-
26tion agreements is largely for naught. As a practical matter, unless a challenged
arbitration mechanism is proven to be substantively unconscionable, the arbitra-
tion agreement creating that mechanism will be deemed valid and enforceable.
The pivotal nature of the substantive unconscionability inquiry was confirmed
by the U.S. Supreme Court's 2011 opinion in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concep-
cion,27 and also in the recent opinion of the California Supreme Court in Sonic-
Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno. Both decisions affirm that in the current legal
23. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
24. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (noting that arbitration agreements
are subject to "generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability").
25. Most states insist on at least a minimum amount of evidence on both prongs. See Morrison v.
Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 666 (6th Cir. 2003) (applying Ohio law); Blue Cross Blue
Shield of Ala. v. Rigas, 923 So. 2d 1077, 1087 (Ala. 2005); Bland ex rel. Coker v. Health Care & Ret.
Corp. of Am., 927 So. 2d 252, 257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) ("Having concluded that the trial court
properly determined that the Agreement was not procedurally unconscionable, we need not address the
issue of substantive unconscionability."); Dan Wiebold Ford, Inc. v. Universal Computer Consulting
Holding, Inc., 127 P.3d 138, 141-42 (Idaho 2005) (applying Michigan law); Murphy v. Mid-West
Nat'l Life Ins. Co. of Tenn., 78 P.3d 766, 768 (Idaho 2003); Myers v. Neb. Inv. Council, 724 N.W.2d
776, 799 (Neb. 2006); Nygaard v. Sioux Valley Hosps. & Health Sys., 731 N.W.2d 184, 194-95 (S.D.
2007). Others employ a sliding scale and let a strong showing on the substantive prong make up for a
weak showing on the procedural prong. See Sprague v. Household Int'l, 473 F. Supp. 2d 966, 971-72
(Mo. App. W.D. 2005); Vockner v. Erickson, 712 P.2d 379, 381-82 (Alaska 1986); Gatton v. T-Mobile
USA, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 344, 350 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007); Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 828
N.E.2d 812, 818 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); MS Credit Ctr., Inc. v. Horton, 926 So. 2d 167, 177 (Miss. 2006);
D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Green, 96 P.3d 1159, 1162 (Nev. 2004); Sitogum Holdings, Inc. v. Ropes, 800
A.2d 915, 923 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002); State v. Wolowitz, 468 N.Y.S.2d 131,145 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1983); Kucan v. Advance Am., 660 S.E.2d 98, 102 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (."[W]hile the presence
of both procedural and substantive problems is necessary for an ultimate finding of unconscionability,
such a finding may be appropriate when a contract presents pronounced substantive unfairness and a
minimal degree of procedural unfairness, or vice versa."' (quoting Tillman v. Commercial Credit
Loans, Inc., 655 S.E.2d 362, 370 (N.C. 2008))); Woodhaven Apartments v. Washington, 942 P.2d 918,
925 (Utah 1997); Roussalis v. Wyo. Med. Ctr., Inc., 4 P.3d 209, 246-47 (Wyo. 2000). A few courts
have opined that substantive unconscionability alone can be sufficient. See Maxwell v. Fid. Fin.
Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 59 (Ariz. 1995) ("[A] claim of unconscionability can be established with a
showing of substantive unconscionability alone, especially in cases involving either price-cost dispari-
ty or limitation of remedies."); Am. Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 201 A.2d 886, 888-89 (N.H.
1964); Res. Mgmt. Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 1043 (Utah 1985) ("Gross
disparity in terms, absent evidence of procedural unconscionability, can support a finding of uncon-
scionability."); Adler v. Fred Lind Manor, 103 P.3d 773, 782 (Wash. 2004).
26. See AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011) (noting that "the times in
which consumer contracts were anything other than adhesive are long past").
27. Id. (overruling Discover Bank which held class-action waivers to be unconscionable).
28. See Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 311 P.3d 184, 203 (Cal. 2013).
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milieu, the substantive unconscionability inquiry is the fulcrum for determining
the enforceability of otherwise valid adhesion employment arbitration agree-
ments.29
This brief overview of relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence reveals the
Court's consecration of employment arbitration, a subset of commercial arbitra-
tion, as an alternative to traditional litigation of employment-related claims. If
employees agree to arbitrate their future employment related claims against the
employer, they will be held to that bargain as long as those agreements are not
substantively unconscionable.
III. THE RAMIFICATIONS OF THE CURRENT LEGAL REALITY FOR
THOUGHTFUL SCHOLARS, EMPLOYERS, EMPLOYEE ADVOCATES, AND
PUBLIC POLICY MAKERS
Stakeholders in the employment arbitration arena must come to terms with
legal reality. As the foregoing section details, the Supreme Court has been unam-
biguous in its endorsement of arbitration agreements, treating the FAA as sacro-
sanct in employment to the same degree as any other context. Pre-dispute adhe-
sive arbitration agreements between employers and employees that cover all man-
ner of potential disputes and that disavow class action procedures are likely to
become ubiquitous in the coming years. This article argues that parties on all
sides of the debate over the propriety and reach of employment arbitration agree-
ments are obliged to emerge from their long-held, entrenched positions on now-
resolved foundational questions of law, and instead focus on ensuring that arbitral
forums provide just and efficient alternatives to the civil justice system, as the
FAA and courts envisioned. In particular, stakeholders should converge around
their shared interests in the design and implementation of arbitration mechanisms
that steer clear substantive unconscionability and are worthy of the trust that Con-
gress and the Court have bestowed on arbitration.
Among academics, much ink has been spilled decrying the U.S. Supreme
Court's systemic march toward full implementation of the FAA's endorsement of
arbitration, including employment arbitration,30 and strategizing ways to halt the
doctrinal developments we have described.31 Much less common are articles fo-
cused on ensuring fair, reasonable, and efficient arbitration procedures, as well as
protections starting with baseline indicators of substantive unconscionability.
This article steps into that gap.
Employee advocates, and the plaintiffs' bar, have likewise looked elsewhere
to thwart the arbitral forum as the dispute resolution mechanism of choice. With
state-law-based collateral attacks on arbitration agreements foiled by the U.S.
Supreme Court and with the rejection of arguments that employment should be the
29. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747; Sonic, 311 P.3d at 203.
30. See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1247 (2009) (attacking the notion that arbitration is fair and egalitarian); id. at 1255 n.17 (collecting
examples of the scholarly attack on mandatory arbitration); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Tainted Love: An
Increasingly Odd Arbitral Infatuation in Derogation of Sound and Consistent Jurisprudence, 60 KAN.
L. REV. 795, 795 (2012) (criticizing the Supreme Court for having "a serious attachment to arbitra-
tion").
31. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Introduction: Dreaming About Arbitration Reform, 8 NEV. L.J. 1, 3-
4 (2007) (introducing a symposium that was focused on proposals to revise the FAA).
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exception to overarching arbitration jurisprudence, anti-arbitration advocates have
focused on legislative change.32 Advocates of the Arbitration Fairness Act [AFA]
and other reformist legislation denunciate the arbitration process, dismissing the
notion that arbitration, if properly done, can provide an adequate measure of jus-
tice to the vast numbers of unorganized American workers who presently have no
meaningful guarantee of workplace due process.33 They have done so largely to
the exclusion of working in concert with arbitrators and arbitration service provid-
ers.
And, yet, all of these efforts perversely valorize a civil justice system that
continues to be hostile and unforgiving to a broad swath of employee claims. For
instance, Clermont and Schwab have described how employment discrimination
plaintiffs have fared far worse than employment discrimination defendants and
comparatively worse than other plaintiffs who pursue a broad range of other
claims, both at trial34 and on appeal.35 Moreover, recent Supreme Court opinions
suggest that providing a full hearing for such claims is far from a priority. Indeed,
both Vance v. Ball State University36 and University of Texas Southwestern Medi-
cal Center v. Nassar3 justify their decidedly employee-unfriendly holdings at
least in part on how they will allow more cases to be resolved prior to trial, partic-
ularly at the summary judgment stage (where we know employees are at a decided
disadvantage). 38 In short, the courts are no panacea for the employee-plaintiff. A
carefully designed and substantively just arbitration system is unlikely to be less
employee friendly than the courts and would trump the courts in terms of afforda-
bility, efficiency, and timeliness. Thus, our goal in this effort is to encourage the
refocusing of advocacy and reformist energies from critique and obstructionism to
positive institutional design: to make arbitration the best it can be.
32. The most important efforts have focused on the AFA. Nonetheless, there have been piecemeal
legislative efforts (and successes) at curbing forced arbitration, particularly of whistleblower claims.
See, e.g., Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-118, § 8116(a), 123 Stat.
3409, 3454 (2009) (banning employment contracts of defense contractors exceeding $1 million from
including predispute agreements to arbitrate sexual harassment claims); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Re-
form and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203 § 748(n)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 1739 (2010) (codi-
fied at 7 U.S.C. § 26(n)(2)); id. at §§ 922(b), (c), 124 Stat. at 1841 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§
1514A(e)(1), (2)) (prohibiting predispute agreements to arbitrate whistleblower claims).
33. But see Martin H. Malin, The Arbitration Fairness Act: It Need Not and Should Not Be an All or
Nothing Proposition, 87 IND. L.J. 289 (2012) (arguing for a "middle ground" on the issue of legislative
reform, involving legislation to curb potential employer abuses of mandatory arbitration without an
outright ban and arbitration industry self-policing).
34. Kevin M. Clermont & Smart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal
Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 103, 112 (2009). Cf Stephen F. Befort, An
Empirical Analysis of Case Outcomes Under the ADA Amendments Act, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
2027 (2013) (showing empirically that courts are finding more ADA plaintiffs unqualified in post-
ADA Amendments Act cases, even as they dismiss fewer cases on a finding of lack of disability one
purpose of the ADA Amendments Act).
35. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 34, at 111.
36. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013).
37. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctrv. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013).
38. See Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2444, 2449 (noting that a positive attribute of the definition of "super-
visor" adopted by the court for purposes of determining an employer's potential for vicarious liability
for supervisory harassment is that "it can be applied without undue difficulty at both the summary
judgment stage and at trial" and "supervisor status will generally be capable of resolution at summary
judgment"); Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2532 ("Even if the employer could escape judgment after trial, the
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To do that, other stakeholders must come on board as well. Employers, the
management bar, arbitrators and arbitration providers, and even courts have roles
to play in this process. First, while employers and the management bar have ac-
complished a comprehensive series of legal victories over past several decades,
certainly those victories have their limits. These wins do not signal that there is an
open season for predatory practices and sham arbitration proceedings. 9 Over-
reaching invites backlash from official channels and, in the interim, harms em-
ployees while undermining the legitimacy of the arbitral forum. Thus, employers
and the management bar would be well served at this point to throw their influ-
ence, resources, and efforts into making arbitration the co-equal, reasonable alter-
native the courts have always argued it is. In other words, we argue that this is a
money-where-your-mouth-is moment in the history of workplace arbitration. Our
goal in the next section is to provide some guidance about where those efforts
should be focused.
Arbitrators, including their professional organizations-like the National
Academy of Arbitrators 40 and the College of Commercial Arbitrators,41 and arbi-
tration service providers such as the American Arbitration Association,
42 JAMS, 43
and the Section of Dispute Resolution of the American Bar Association-should
adopt a proactive posture and take the lead in designing, promoting, and institu-
tionalizing the kinds of procedures and measures we outline in Part IV, collective-
ly and individually. If employment arbitration is to reach full potential, a core
cadre of unquestionably neutral, fully qualified employment arbitrators must lead
its evolution. As the most consistent repeat players, arbitrators and their organiza-
tions simply must be on the leading edge of creating an arbitration standard that is
in line with the expectations of Congress and the Supreme Court.
Finally, state and federal judges and legislators play a less obvious but none-
theless vital role in the process of ensuring forced workplace arbitration is fair,
efficient, and effective for all involved. Given the central role the doctrine of
substantive unconscionability plays in setting the parameters of legally sufficient
arbitration procedures, judges should provide clear and consistent guidance in the
development and refinement of the doctrine. 44 The characteristics we describe
below are only valid and valuable to the extent that they are met with relative
certainty that they pass muster under standards of substantive unconscionability.
Incentives to invest in and endorse these initiatives are only present to the extent
that the doctrine has some meaningful structure. Carefully crafted and elucidated
legislation and judicial opinions are essential.
39. Courts will set limits. See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999)
(refusing to enforce an agreement that resulted in the arbitrator chair being drawn from a list essential-
ly created and populated by the employer).
40. NAT'L ACAD. ARB., http://www.naarb.org/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2015).
41. C. COM. ARB., http://www.thecca.net/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2015).
42. AM. ARB. Ass'N, http://www.adr.org/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2015).
43. JAMS: THE RESOLUION EXPERTS, http://www.jamsadr.com/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2015).
44. Notably, this calls for more practical guidance than a series of pithy phrases that courts have
used to describe substantively unconscionable contract terms. See, e.g., Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v.
Moreno, 311 P.3d 184, 202 (Cal. 2013) (listing the particularly unhelpful phrases such as "overly
harsh," "unduly oppressive," "so one-sided as to shock the conscience," and "unfairly one-sided")
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Cf Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456-57
(2006) (holding that a standard of proving pretext under Title VII that required showing a "disparity in
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IV. THE FRAMEWORK FOR BUILDING AN ADEQUATE EMPLOYMENT
ARBITRATION MECHANISM
It is abundantly clear that waiting for the courts to determine the precise pa-
rameters of legally defendable, adequate employment arbitration procedures
through piecemeal application of the substantive unconscionability doctrine is not
an effective means for bringing employment arbitration to a mature state. 45 In
order to accelerate that evolution, this section identifies and briefly explicates the
key elements of an efficacious employment arbitration mechanism.
The proposed model of employment arbitration procedure takes its start-
ing point in the relevant case law pertaining to the substantive unconscionability
doctrine, most particularly the 2000 opinion of the California Supreme Court in
Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc.46 and the U.S. Su-
preme Court's 2011 opinion in AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion.47 The model
procedure outlined below embraces several dimensions not addressed in the sub-
stantive unconscionability case law which are necessary if employer-promulgated
arbitration mechanisms are to truly secure the essential workplace due process
rights of employees.
A. The Nature of the Arbitration Agreement
The procedure must be set out in clearly stated, straightforward terms that are
decipherable to those unfamiliar with arbitration and the vernacular of the legal
world. Any employee with the ability to read should be able to understand the
terms of the employment arbitration agreement he/she is being asked to accept.
B. The Requirement of a Mutually Binding, Bilateral Procedure
Employment arbitration agreements should require both the employer and the
employee to submit all employment-related claims within the agreement's scope
to arbitration and should bind both equally to the results of the arbitration.
C. The Scope of the Employment Arbitration Mechanism
It is unrealistic to expect that employers will open their unilaterally promul-
gated arbitration procedures to the full range of employment-related decisions. It
is therefore unrealistic to propose that matters pertaining to disputed personnel
actions like promotions, demotions, transfers, performance appraisal and the like
be made subject to these devices. 48 However, if employers are in fact committed
to creating an alternative dispute resolution device that goes to the core of em-
ployee workplace due process, they must extend the scope of their employment
45. That more practical, objective and holistic guidance is necessary to accelerate and discipline the
evolution of employment arbitration is demonstrated by the frequent failure of the courts to provide
adequate, objective guidance as to the parameters of the substantive unconscionability doctrine.
46. 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000).
47. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
48. Of course, claimant employees would be able to challenge these non-disciplinary, employment-
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arbitration procedures to reach issues pertaining to discharge and disciplinary
actions that may eventually lead to discharge. Those employers must also be will-
ing to embrace the well-established arbitral principle of just cause for discipline
drawn from the some 70 years of experience in labor-management arbitration in
the unionized sector.49 Otherwise, the purported guarantee of workplace due pro-
cess offered by the employer-promulgated employment arbitration mechanism
will be of little value to employees.
50
D. Mutual Selection of the Arbitratorfrom a Well- Vetted Array of
Qualified, Neutral Candidate Arbitrators
The linchpin of a fair, effective employment arbitration mechanism is the as-
surance that arbitration awards will bind employers and employees, and also that
the arbitrators themselves will be qualified to do the work and will be truly neu-
tral.51 This can be achieved most expeditiously by an alternate-striking arbitrator
selection device from odd-numbered lists of candidate arbitrators (e.g., five or
seven candidates) provided by bona fide neutral bodies like the American Arbitra-
tion Association or the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.52 Further-
more, because their neutrality is suspect from the outset, attorneys or other indi-
viduals who actively represent either employers or employees should not be per-
mitted to serve as employment arbitrators. Of course, the arbitration agreement
should call for full disclosure of any potential conflicts of interest that might
prompt a reasonable, objective person to question a candidate arbitrator's impar-
tiality because of a known, existing substantial relationship with one of the parties.
E. A Fair Allocation of the Employee's Costs in Arbitration
This element of a fair employment arbitration mechanism is difficult to define
precisely. Ideally, claimant employees should not be required to bear any costs
they would not incur if their claims were adjudicated in a court of law.53 Obvious-
ly, the "fail-safe" position is for the arbitration agreement to provide that the em-
ployer will pay all forum costs and arbitrator fees.5 4 It must be emphasized that
nothing in substantive unconscionability doctrine requires that arbitration be cost-
free for claimant employees.
49. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI: How ARBITRATION WORKS 15-1 to 15-82 (Kenneth May et al. eds.,
7th ed. 2012).
50. The authors acknowledge that this element of our proposed model mechanism would require
employers to effectively surrender their discretion to terminate employees for any reason, or for no
reason secured to them by the ubiquitous employment-at-will doctrine. That is a step we believe
necessary to adequately secure the workplace due process rights of employees who are forced to agree
to employment arbitration as a condition of their employment.
51. Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., Inc., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
52. For an example of a selection process that ran afoul of basic indicators of fairness, see Hooters
of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999) (selecting arbitrator from a list essentially created
and populated by the employer).
53. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1484.
54. A major concern of fully employer-paid arbitration is raised by the oft-cited fears of pro-
employer arbitrator bias stemming from the "repeat player effect." See Lisa B. Bingham, Employment
Arbitration: The RepeatPlayer Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 189 (1997).
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While it may not be necessary for employers to bear the full costs of arbitra-
tion,55 including the payment of arbitrator fees and expenses and attorneys' fees
for claimant employees, any cost allocation formula must contemplate the relative
economic standing of the employer and its employees. At a minimum, the proce-
dure should permit the arbitrator to allocate the costs of arbitration including fees,
and to award attorney's fees to the successful claimant employee.
F. Adequate Pre-Hearing Discovery
Arbitration works best when the preliminaries are kept to a minimum, only
that which is necessary to ensure a fair contest at the hearing, based on relevant
facts. A fair, well-drawn employment arbitration procedure will set reasonable
bounds on the discovery process' 6 (e.g., by appropriately cabining the number of
depositions, interrogatories, and requests for production permitted both of the
parties" ) and guarantee the sufficiency of the process by granting the arbitrator
authority to direct the discovery that is necessary given the circumstances.
58
G. Ensuring that Claimant Employees Get Their Day in Court
One of the key aspects of a fair, effective employment arbitration procedure is
that it satisfactorily safeguards the right of claimant employees to have their "day
in court.,,5 9 At the same time, employment arbitration does not need to incorpo-
rate the full range of pre-trial procedures emblematic of traditional litigation, most
particularly the summary judgment device that will so often preclude plaintiff
employees from securing a full hearing on their claims of wrongful conduct by the
employer. 60 Granted, this would be a concession for the typical "lawyered-up"
employer, but that concession would fully demonstrate the employer's commit-
ment to a full and fair airing and decision of its employees' claims of unfair or
illegal treatment in the workplace.
H. Specification of the Arbitrator's Authority
It is essential that an agreement grant the arbitrator the authority necessary to
oversee both the pre-hearing aspects of the arbitration tribunal and the ability to
conduct a full and fair search for the truth at the arbitration hearing. Instructive
here is § 15(a) of the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, which states:
55. But see Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 684-89 (Cal. 2000).
56. Id. at 683-85; Cole, 105 F.3d at 1482.
57. Most often courts find preferable those forms of discovery approved by the Supreme Court in
Gilmer, which include "document production, information requests, depositions, and subpoenas."
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991).
58. Shubin v. William Lyon Homes, Inc., 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 390, 399 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (stating
that when "employer agreed to arbitrate the FEHA claim, it implicitly consented to discovery sufficient
for Shubin to adequately arbitrate her statutory claim").
59. An attribute of arbitration is the existence of "efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to the
type of dispute." AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011); see also Sonic-
Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d 58, 72 (Cal. 2011) ("[A]rbitration . . . still generally
bears the hallmark of a formal legal proceeding . .
60. See supra notes 34-38.
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[The] arbitrator may conduct an arbitration in such manner as the arbitra-
tor considers appropriate for a fair and expeditious disposition of the pro-
ceeding. The authority conferred upon the arbitrator includes the power
to hold conferences with the parties to the arbitration proceeding before
the hearing and, among other matters, determine the admissibility, rele-
vance, materiality and weight of any evidence.
61
In addition, the arbitration agreement should expressly delegate to arbitrators
the authority to make substantive arbitrability determinations; 62 to administer
oaths and subpoena witnesses; and to modify or correct an award upon the request
of one or both parties. Finally, to ensure symmetry between the remedies availa-
ble to claimant employees in arbitration and a court,63 arbitrators should be grant-
ed full remedial authority, including the discretion to grant punitive damages,
attorneys' fees, award expenses to prevailing claimant employees where appropri-
ate, and to retain jurisdiction regarding the effectuation of any remedy directed by
the award.
I. The Requirement ofReasoned Written Awards
The best way to ensure a full and fair process and objective, defensible out-
comes in employment arbitration is to require that arbitrators provide the parties
with written awards64 adequately demonstrating their key findings of fact; inter-
pretation and application of relevant law, personnel policies, and any other rele-
vant promulgations; and their reasoning in reaching the decision.65 The require-
ment of reasoned awards of this nature also serves as a disincentive to those aspir-
ing arbitrators who are not willing to demonstrate their competence by revealing
the rationale underpinning their awards. Given the Supreme Court's current posi-
tion with regard to the very narrow grounds for vacatur of commercial arbitration
awards-centering on, and likely exclusively limited to, the exceedingly narrow
grounds articulated in section 10(a)(2) of the FAA 66 -arbitrators and employers
are no longer justified in fearing that opinions provide fodder for appeal or in-
crease the risk of vacatur.
67
61. Unif. Arbitration Act § 15(a) (2000).
62. Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2775 (2010) (holding a delegation clause
"clearly and unmistakenly [sic]" conferred upon the arbitrator authority to decide the validity of the
arbitration agreement).
63. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745, 759-60 (Cal. 2000).
64. Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., Inc., 105 F.3d 1465, 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
65. Armendariz, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 762 ("[I]n order for judicial review to be successfully accom-
plished, an arbitrator in a FEHA case must issue a written arbitration decision that will reveal, however
briefly, the essential findings and conclusions on which the award is based.").
66. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
67. Although not directly linked to the scope of the current analysis, the authors also urge a new,
expanded transparency in the employment arbitration sphere whereby arbitration awards are gathered
and made accessible to interested parties. Such a development would be a key to establishing a very
useful and instructive "common-law of the shop of employment arbitration" similar to that upon which
the guiding principles relied upon by labor arbitrators have evolved as a result of the long-time publi-
cation of selected labor arbitration awards by Bloomberg BNA and Commerce Clearing House, and
the emergence of and continuing revision of the seminal work by Frank and Edna Elkouri. ELKOURI &
ELKOURI, supra note 49.
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The above roadmap to the key elements of a defensible and optimally effec-
tive employment arbitration mechanism may well not be exhaustive and may not
constitute the optimal endpoint in the conversation as to what it will take to make
arbitration work in the non-union employment sector. However, it is certainly an
adequate starting point for a meaningful dialogue directed toward the goal of mak-
ing employment arbitration a viable, widely-acceptable alternative to the often
frustrating and futile end game that employees find in traditional litigation of their
employment-related claims. The concluding section below contains a call to ac-
tion for all of those truly concerned with ensuring that employees be granted supe-
rior alternative than the one being provided by the current legal milieu.
V. A CALL FOR ACTION
The arguments of those who oppose employer-imposed employment arbitra-
tion center on the essential unfairness of employees being forced to arbitrate their
employment-related claims without being given any real choice in the decision to
arbitrate, or to the terms of those arbitration agreements. 68 Arbitration agreements
unilaterally imposed on employees as a condition of their employment are by
definition procedurally unconscionable. That fact notwithstanding, courts will
deem adhesion employment arbitration agreements unenforceable only if their
terms are substantively unconscionable.
This legal reality leaves all stakeholders in the employment arbitration pro-
cess (the plaintiffs' and public interest bar, legal scholars opposed to adhesion
arbitration agreements, employers, employment arbitrators and their professional
associations, and bona fide neutral arbitration service providers) with only one
logical avenue of pursuit going forward. The substantive unconscionability doc-
trine is the ultimate test for determining the enforceability of adhesion employ-
ment arbitration agreements, but it is only a starting point for constructing em-
ployment arbitration devices that adequately secure the workplace due process
rights of employees. Consequently, parties who are truly concerned with ensuring
the workplace due process rights of unrepresented, at-will employees should focus
their efforts on building employment arbitration mechanisms that will pass muster
under the substantive unconscionability rubric and that, as a result, will allow
arbitration to rightfully occupy the preferred status the FAA grants it.
The time has passed for idealistic, shortsighted, and arguably self-centered
posturing by the opponents of employment arbitration, and for overreaching by
employers advised by counsel who seek to "win" at all cost by incorporating ob-
jectively unfair, one-sided terms in arbitration agreements. The parameters of the
legal playing field for employment arbitration are now clear. This piece sets out a
concise, straightforward template that articulates the key elements that serve to
68. See Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Contracts: A Call
for Reform, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1237 (2001); Margaret M. Harding, The Redefinition of Arbitration by
Those with Superior Bargaining Power, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 857; Margaret L. Moses, Privatized "'Jus-
tice, " 36 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 535 (2005); Barry Meier, In Fine Print, Customers Lose Ability to Sue,
N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 1997), available at http://www.nytimes.com/1997/03/10/business/in-fine-print-
customers-lose-ability-to-sue.html; Jane Spencer, Signing Away Your Right to Sue, WALL ST. J., Oct.
1, 2003, at DI. In fairness, the anti-arbitration forces have not exhibited an explicit opposition to all
forms of commercial and employment arbitration. The focal point of their attacks has always been on
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define the character of employer-mandated, adhesion employment arbitration
agreements that will both be deemed enforceable pursuant to section 2 of the
FAA, and provide the employees required to enter into those agreements as a con-
dition of their employment with adequate protections against most forms of unfair
treatment in the workplace. This solution is offered as a reliable starting point for
a recalibrated conversation regarding employment arbitration.
The gauntlet has been thrown down. It is up to those who truly seek work-
place justice for American employees to respond affirmatively to the challenge.
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